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An economic policy for the fifth long wave
 * 
ANGELO REATI and JAN TOPOROWSKI 
In the first part of this paper we recall the main features of the long-
waves theory, a theory that, at the present stage of development of 
economic thought, is in our view the most valuable to understand the 
present situation and, consequently, offers the best guidance for eco-
nomic policy. In the second part we shall outline some possible policy 
implications that can be derived from such an approach. 
1. The long waves in economic development 
1.1. The facts 
A growing number of economic historians agree that long-term eco-
nomic development of capitalist economies is an uneven phenome-
non: periods of sustained growth of output and trade of about 25 to 
30 years are followed by periods of slow or stagnating growth of a- 
nalogous duration. Similar movements also appear in prices and other 
monetary variables. Up to now Western economies experienced four  
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long waves and at present we entered into the fifth one. Table 1 sum-
marises these movements.
1 
Long waves start in some ‘core’ countries, or technological lead-
ers, and then spread to other economies, reaching the less developed 
regions only later on. As table 1 indicates, the first long wave origi-
nated from the early mechanisation (the industrial revolution); the 
technological leaders were Britain, France and Belgium, followed by 
the German states and the Netherlands. The second long wave was the 
era of steam power and railways, the technological leaders being the 
same as the first long wave plus Germany and the USA, and the fol-
lowers were Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria-Hungary. 
The third long wave was the era of electrical and heavy engineering. 
The earlier leaders succeeded in keeping their position, a position that 
they shared with Switzerland and the Netherlands that were thus 
‘upgraded’ with respect to the previous wave. Italy and Austria-
Hungary continued to play the role of followers, joined by Canada, 
Japan, Russia and two European Nordic countries (Sweden and Den-
mark). It was during this wave that Taylorism appeared. The fourth 
long wave was the era of mass production (the Fordism)
2 that spread 
all over Western Europe, the USA, USSR, Japan and Australia. The 
followers were located in Eastern Europe, Asia (Korea, China, India 
Taiwan), as well as in Central and South America (Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Venezuela). The present fifth long wave is produced by the 
computerization of the entire economy and the information and 
communication technologies (ICT). The technological leaders are 
Japan, the USA, the European countries, Canada, Australia, Korea and 
Taiwan. The followers are numerous and include all those of the 
previous wave plus some other Asian countries (Indonesia, Pakistan) 
and very few African countries (Nigeria, Algeria, Tunisia). 
Of course, each historical period is unique but, in spite of these 
peculiarities, “there is a certain sequence of events that recurs about 
every half century” (Pérez 2002, p. xvii) – i.e. technological revolu-
tions, financial bubbles, collapses, golden ages, political unrests. This 
opens the possibility to construct a theory that explains the causes and 
mechanisms of the common characteristics of each long-term move-
–––––––––– 
1  See also Freeman and Pérez (1988 reprinted 1996, Table 3.1, pp. 254-61). 
2 The ‘Fordist’ system originates from Henry Ford’s intuition that, to make 
profits, the best customers for his products should be his workers. The system com-
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ment, and that also offers guidance for economic policy. We shall 
come back on this after discussing some theoretical and methodologi-
cal aspects. 
1.2. The Classical roots of the long-wave theory 
Growth – and its uneven unfolding – was one of the main concerns of 
classical economists (Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Marx), but the long-
term oscillatory pattern of prices and output also attracted the atten-
tion of some of the founders of marginalism, such as Jevons (who in 
1884 analysed the long-term fluctuations in prices) and Clark. They 
were joined by other exponents of the marginalist school (particularly, 
in 1913, Pareto, Bresciani Turroni, Aftalion) so that, at the beginning 
of the 20th century, there was a consensus among many economists 
on the reality of what was later called the long wave. 
However, the gradual ascendancy of the neoclassical theory – 
culminating with the model of general equilibrium – diverted atten-
tion from growth and its irregularities. When the theory of growth 
returned to the forefront of interest in the 1950s, the focus was on 
conditions for regular growth (the ‘steady state’). The business cycle 
was not ignored, but it was treated within the conceptual framework 
of equilibrium, on the basis of the ‘rocking horse’ metaphor. Accord-
ing to this metaphor, the economic system tends spontaneously to 
equilibrium. Cycles are exogenous perturbations produced by random 
shocks (impulse generation), which trigger an endogenous propagation 
mechanism with stabilizing properties. This provides the rationale for 
separating growth and fluctuations, that is, for decomposing the 
movement of an economic system into trend and cycle. Trend is 
conceived as the loci of equilibria – a moving centre of gravitation – 
while cycle is restricted to the analysis of the stochastic error term of 
series and to the properties of the equilibration mechanism.
3 
Long-wave theory – also known as the Kondratiev’s long cycles 
– sprang from the classical approach, particularly from Marxian analy-
sis, whose focus on the general laws governing capitalism in the long 
run provided a fertile ground for its appearance. Thus it is not by 
chance that the pioneers (Parvus 1901, van Gelderen 1913, de Wolff 
–––––––––– 
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1924) belonged to such a school. Although the long-wave phenome-
non was already acknowledged in the 19th century, Kondratiev 
amassed the first substantial empirical evidence in 1925. Kondratiev’s 
contribution on the causes of the ‘long cycle’, was rather weak. 
Schumpeter, in his Business Cycles, filled the gap in 1939. The system-
atic explanation he gave is based on technological revolutions and 
their diffusion. Radical process and product innovations − noted 
Schumpeter − do not appear at random, but they bring together a 
bundle of other incremental and fundamental innovations, triggering a 
“creative destruction” that generates growth while renewing entirely 
the structure of society.  
The last three decades saw a flourishing literature that developed 
Schumpeter’s insights, studying particularly the motives and mecha-
nisms of innovations as well as their systemic and institutional com-
ponents.
4 Three features of the system, which interact with one an-
other, are at the roots of the recurring sequence of waves: 
− the fact that technological change occurs by clusters of radi-
cal innovations forming successive revolutions that modernise the 
whole productive structure; 
− the functional separation between financial and production 
capital, each pursing profits by different means; and  
−  the much greater inertia and resistance to change of the 
socio-institutional framework in comparison with the techno-
economic sphere, which is spurred by competitive pressures (Pérez 
2002, p. 6). 
1.3. The debate 
Economists are divided on the nature and interpretation of the long-
wave phenomenon, and for many of them this is a matter that has still 
not been settled. Two areas are object of intense debate. First, on the 
facts – are long waves a real phenomenon? Second (given the first), 
what is the nature of the long-term movement? 
–––––––––– 
4  See, for instance, the collected readings in Freeman (ed. 1996) and Louçã and 
Reijnders (ed. 1999). See also Tylecote (1992 and 1994). BNL Quarterly Review  400 
a) The first problem arises because econometric research from 
the 1980s onwards does not give unambiguous support to the existence 
of long waves in output. A long list of empirical works leading to 
contradictory results could be cited.
5 Studies by Metz (1992) illustrate 
the difficulties of drawing sustainable conclusions from the available 
data. In 1992, using new filtering techniques, this author presented 
robust evidence on the existence of long waves. In 1996, relying on 
different econometric techniques, he was unable to detect a long wave 
movement in the same data he used for his 1992 research (output series 
for Germany; Metz 1996)! 
Freeman and Louçã (2001) discuss this methodological ques-
tion by considering two classes of models: i) the traditional statistical 
and econometric analysis and ii) the simulations from formal models. 
The first type of models identifies long waves by separating the cycles 
from the trend on the basis of several techniques (moving-average 
smoothing techniques, growth rate computation, spectral analysis). 
Freeman and Louçã criticize this approach on two grounds – theoreti-
cal and technical. On the theoretical level they observe that the ra-
tionale for separating growth and fluctuations is based on the general 
equilibrium paradigm and the ‘rocking horse’ metaphor – something 
that implies a number of strong and unrealistic assumptions on the 
nature of the trend (trend is deterministic and is related to equilib-
rium; it is stable over very long periods; trend and cycle are independ-
ent). However, if the trend is stochastic and/or influences the cycle, 
then the breakdown is indeterminate (Louçã 1997, p. 192).
6  
At the technical level the influence of a trend needs to be re-
moved from time-series data, since the usual statistical techniques to 
identify long waves require that series be stationary. The problem is 
that the detrending procedures of the original data are not neutral 
with respect to the results on the existence of cycles: “the smoothing 
techniques may create artefacts” (Freeman and Louçã 2001, p. 99). 
This criticism also applies to spectral analysis – one of the most so-
–––––––––– 
5  See Freeman (1996, part IV) and Louçã and Reijnders (1999, part II). 
6  This latter point has been demonstrated by Pasinetti (1981, pp. 232-36), who 
showed that the structural dynamics of the economy (technical change and new 
patterns of demand) – which establishes the trend – also generates the cycle as an 
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phisticated techniques to study long waves.
7 There are other, specific 
problems with spectral analysis. They result, for instance, from the 
relative shortness of the available data series (that usually cover 200-
250 observations, which is insufficient for a correct application of the 
method in question), and from the requirement in the analysis for a 
regular amplitude of cycles. This last is not found in reality and is not 
necessary for the existence of long waves.
8  
The second type of models (the simulation models) was devel-
oped in the 1970s by Forrester (1977), from MIT, and consists of 
constructing a mathematical model that mimics the evolution of real 
aggregate economic series. The resemblance between the computed 
and the historical series is deemed sufficient proof of the causal links 
identified by the long-wave theory. Although recognizing the interest 
of this approach, one can argue that it suffers from serious limitations  
“since simulation is not demonstrative proof. […] Models are useful 
metaphors for the creation of hypotheses in order to analyze real-
ity, but they are not the reality itself, nor can they reproduce it” 
(Freeman and Louçã 2001, p. 117).  
Thus we sympathise with Freeman and Louçã’s model of “reasoned 
history” – an approach that does not reject quantitative analysis but 
that goes far beyond it by adopting a complex determination ap-
proach, in which the purely statistical evidence is put on the same 
footing as social, institutional and political factors. In other words, 
history provides the final criterion for the detection of the turning 
–––––––––– 
7  Spectral analysis is a method to discover the hidden periodicity of a time series. 
This kind of series can be thought as the sum (or ‘spectrum’) of a large number of 
independent sine functions with different amplitudes. In economics, these superposing 
trigonometric functions refer to cycles of different length. For output, for instance, 
we have short-term cycles of 3-5 years (the Kitchin, or inventory cycles), the medium-
term cycles of 7-11 years (the Juglar, resulting from investments in machinery), the 
longer 15-25 year cycles (the Kuznets, resulting from investment in construction), the 
50-60 years long waves (the Kondratiev). Each cycle contributes to the total variance 
of the series. Spectral analysis consists in decomposing the total variance of the series 
into the contribution of individual cycles (the frequencies of the sine function), thus 
allowing the simultaneous estimation of the relative importance of cycles of different 
duration. 
8  Within this context Freeman and Louçã address the question of the a priori 
elimination of the impact of the war periods, that can be seen as ‘disturbances’ in the 
normal structure of data. According to some empirical studies (e.g. Metz 1992), only 
the interpolation for these periods allows the existence of long waves to be confirmed. 
Freeman and Louçã condemn such a procedure since “erasing part of history is not a 
method to study history” (Freeman and Louçã 2001, p. 116). BNL Quarterly Review  402 
points of cycles and for the interpretation of the results. This also 
means that, for a complete explanation, it is necessary to supplement a 
statistical identification of long waves with an explanation of how 
institutional constraints and economic processes give rise to particular 
statistical outcomes. 
Note, however, that this does not undermine the possibility of 
constructing a theory of growth since the reasoned history model is 
indeed capable of identifying and explaining recurrent phenomena, as 
well as special cases: “the fundamental [...] [laws] still apply as time 
goes by” (Freeman and Louçã 2001, p. 122), even though each period 
has its own unique characteristics that Kronos swallows forever. 
b) The second problem concerns the alleged quasi-cyclical pat-
tern of long waves. Some maintain that what are called long waves (or 
long cycles) are instead phases of capitalist development – i.e. struc-
tural change – that, as such, have unique and unrepeatable characteris-
tics (Maddison 1981, Solomou 1987). In particular, long waves would 
be correlated with the rise and decline of an international hegemonic 
power: UK in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, the US 
afterwards (Arrighi 1994).  
All this is not contested by those arguing that the long wave 
has a quasi-cyclical nature. But they observe that, in spite of the pecu-
liarities and the unrepeatable character of each wave, it is possible to 
single out some common causes for the upswings and the upper turn-
ing points of the four long waves that we experienced since the indus-
trial revolution, and that are summarized in table 1. The driving forces 
and mechanisms of this stable causal structure provide the theoretical 
framework for analyzing the economic development of the last two 
centuries. 
1.4. The unifying characteristics of long waves 
In fact, two recurrent phenomena justify the concept of ‘wave’ rather 
than simply ‘stages’ of capitalist development: i) the technological 
revolutions that are at the root of each wave (see table 1) and ii) the 
structural crises of adjustment. On the first point, historical experience 
allows the following generalizations (Pérez 1983 and 2002; Freeman 
and Louçã 2001, pp. 147-48): An economic policy for the fifth long wave  403 
− each long wave relies on the availability of one or more key 
factors − or ‘core inputs’ − (iron, coal, steel, oil, electronic chips) that 
are supplied at low and falling relative cost in almost unlimited quanti-
ties over long periods and have a potential for use in many products 
and processes throughout the economic system. The sectors producing 
these core inputs (the ‘motive branches’) became major industries with 
each successive wave; 
−  the new products based on the core inputs and some 
complementary inputs stimulate the rise of other new industries 
(‘carrier branches’), whose rapid growth and great market potential 
give a strong impetus to the growth of the entire economy. A process 
of cumulative growth can start, reinforced by the other branches that 
follow in the wake of the leading sectors (the ‘induced growth 
branches’); 
− new infrastructures are needed to serve the new industries 
and this, in turn, stimulates the further growth of both motive and 
carrier branches; 
− the structural change arising from the technological revolu-
tion requires organizational innovations needed to design, produce, 
use and distribute the new products and processes. Gradually new 
‘common sense’ rules for managing and organizing the new technol-
ogy emerge through trial and error and extend from new industries to 
the old ones. It is what is called a new ‘techno-economic paradigm’, or 
‘new technological style’. 
The second point (the crises of adjustment) relates to the fact 
that the take-off and the generalization of new ‘techno-economic 
paradigm’ are far from being a smooth process, as they entail acute 
social conflicts. In fact, the new paradigm starts its diffusion during the 
long stagnation – when the old paradigm has exhausted its possibili-
ties. During this period, strong vested interests, habits, routines, cul-
tural norms and regulations associated with the previous paradigm 
oppose change. The downswing of the long wave is thus a period of 
great turbulence and conflict, characterized by a mismatch between 
the techno-economic subsystem and the institutional structure.
9 Tyle-
–––––––––– 
9  The term ‘institutional structure’ should be understood in a broad sense, in-
cluding not only regulation, norms and standards, but also the system of social 
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cote (1994, p. 484) distinguishes four types of mismatch: i) microeco-
nomic, if the organisation of the firm is unsuited to the new techno-
logical paradigm; ii) macroeconomic, when the diffusion of the new 
technological style goes together with the development of imbalances, 
particularly income inequalities that prevent the required expansion of 
consumer demand; iii) sociopolitical mismatch, such that a sociopoli-
tical crisis arises out of the diffusion of the new style. The downswing 
is overcome only when a new institutional structure replaces the old 
one, bringing the system towards a period of stability and growth.  
This is really a crucial point – a point that echoes the Marxian 
analysis of the contradictions of capitalism as source of crisis
10 and that 
distinguishes the long-wave theory from technological determinism. In 
the uneven process of structural change that characterizes the incipient 
long wave at the international level, the winners are the countries that 
adapt their institutions more rapidly to the requirements of the new 
techno-economic paradigm. The countries that do not succeed in ad- 
opting the appropriate institutional changes would be excluded from 
the benefits of the new techno-economic paradigm; others that adapt 
slowly or insufficiently would delay the appearance of the new long 
wave.
11 In this sense the long wave theory is not a forecasting tool, 
social evolution being an open-ended process. 
To facilitate the understanding of the proposals of part II of this 
paper, it is useful to explain the role of financial capital and give more 
details on the different phases of the long-wave. 
1.5. Technological revolutions and finance capital
12 
Pérez (2002) pushes forward the theoretical frontier of long waves by 
investigating the financial aspects – a task that is fulfilled by combin-
–––––––––– 
the French school of régulation call a “régime de régulation” (Aglietta 1997, Boyer and 
Saillard 1995). 
10  See on this Screpanti (1984), Rosier and Dockès (1983). In his Marxist 
interpretation of long waves Mandel (1995) too puts great emphasis on the social 
conflicts resulting fom the contradictions accumulated during the long expansion as 
one of the main causes of the upper turning point of the wave. 
11 On the risks of a failure of the ‘new economy’, see Freeman (2001). O’Hara 
(2002 and 2003) explains that a new long wave upswing has not yet emerged in the US 
because appropriate institutional adaptations are still lacking. 
12 This paragraph summarizes Pérez (2002). An economic policy for the fifth long wave  405 
ing economic analysis, sociology and history. In this way she is able to 
clarify the mechanisms explaining why, at a certain period of the 
installation phase of the new technological paradigm, financial capital 
progressively abandons its instrumental role with respect to produc-
tive capital and becomes the dominant player of the game. Instead of 
being a facilitator for the accumulation of productive assets, financial 
capital assumes an independent life, decoupled from productive activ-
ity, and directs the economy according to its interests and criteria. The 
complex – and sometimes conflicting – relationships between financial 
and productive capital can be better understood by referring to the 
four phases of each technological revolution as are depicted in figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1 
THE LIFE CYCLE OF A TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 
 
Source: Pérez (2002, p. 30). 
− Phase 1 marks the early establishment of the new paradigm. 
Pérez (2002) calls it irruption − a period of contrast, as the beginning 
of the technological revolution surges amidst a world threatened with 
stagnation. The decline of old industries as well as high and increasing 
unemployment juxtaposes the intense activity of entrepreneurs operat-
ing within the new technological style. In Pérez characterisation, it is a 
“time for technology”. A mass of money capital, still generated by the 
firms of the old paradigm, is available and looks for opportunities. BNL Quarterly Review  406 
There is also a marked revival of the stock market, first in relation to 
the new industries and soon after with new financial instruments and 
speculation. 
− Phase 2 is when the technological paradigm has framed its 
way and has become fully apparent. It is also the time where  
“financial capital takes over; its immediate interests overrule the 
operation of the whole system. The paper economy decouples 
from the real economy, finance decouples from production while 
there is a growing rift between the forces in the economy and the 
regulatory framework, turned impotent” (Pérez 2002, p. 50).  
It is the frenzy phase, a “time for finance”, characterised by turbulence 
and large and growing inequalities in the distribution of income. The 
wealth that has grown and concentrated in relatively few hands is 
greater than what can be absorbed by real investment; speculation 
flourishes and the economy tends to become a “casino capitalism”, 
with asset inflation in the stock market. “Late Frenzy is financial 
bubble time” (ibid., p. 52) and financial crashes eventually draw the 
system into recession. Yet the frenzy phase is also one of intense 
exploration of all the possibilities opened up by the technological 
revolution. Through a trial and error process of investment,  
“the potential of the diffusing paradigm for creating new markets 
and for rejuvenating old industries is fully discovered and [...] in-
stalled in the economy and in the mental maps of investors. Hence 
the productivity explosion reaches more and more activities, induc-
ing a process of restructuring [...] where the new or renewed pros-
per and the old wilt and die. The process is intensified by the avail-
ability of the new infrastructure” (ibid., p. 51); 
− The  turning point represents the fundamental change to 
move the system from the frenzy mode, shaped by financial criteria, 
to a synergy mode, based on the logic of production. It is the time 
for “rethinking and rerouting development”. As Pérez (ibid., p. 52) 
explains, such a process “can take any amount of time, from a few 
months to several years”, since the structural tensions created by the 
frenzy phase can be overcome only through institutional recomposi-
tion.  An economic policy for the fifth long wave  407 
“This essentially means that adequate regulation of financial capital 
has to be established and an institutional framework favouring the 
real economy over the paper economy needs to be put in place. Yet 
financial capital will resist with force” and it “is only likely to ac-
cept regulation after much of the rapidly made gains have evapo-
rated in the collapse and when the recession has shown the practi-
cal impossibility of reviving the casino” (ibid., p. 111).
13  
− If the process of rerouting the system ends successfully, the 
system enters into the ‘golden age’ of the synergy phase – the time for 
production (phase 3). Even if the mode of growth continues to be 
shaped by the interests of financial capital, it is now more directly tied 
to production than in the frenzy phase. Production becomes the key 
word, full employment becomes a possibility and social cohesiveness 
can be established. The logic of the new paradigm permeates every 
activity, from business to government and education. 
− What drives the system to the forth phase – the maturity – 
is the exhaustion of the technological possibilities of the paradigm: 
when the diffusion of the technological revolution is complete, pro-
ductivity cannot grow substantially any more. Markets are saturating 
and profits feel the productivity constriction as well as the effects of 
the social struggles that, historically, have characterised this phase of 
the wave.
14 The system enters into stagnation. This switches attention 
to the next generation of radical technical change, opening the door to 
the installation period of the new long wave. Maturity is the ‘time for 
questioning complacency’. 
Phases one and two form the installation period of the new para-
digm, from the early diffusion of the new technologies to their full 
visibility. Phases three and four constitute the deployment period, when 
the technical, organisational and institutional components of the 
techno-economic paradigm are fully adapted, then reach maturity and 
start to show inadequacies, announcing the exhaustion of the potenti-
alities of the paradigm. 
–––––––––– 
13 Pérez (2002, p. 115) observes that there are three structural tensions that make 
it impossible to keep the frenzy process going for an indefinite time. There are 
tensions between real and paper wealth, between the profile of existing demand and 
that of potential supply in the core products of the revolution, and between the 
socially excluded and those reaping the benefits of the bubble. 
14 For an analysis of the latter aspect see Screpanti (1984) and Rosier and Dockès 
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Pérez calls the early applications of the new technologies the big 
bang, taking the form of a highly visible event that symbolises the 
whole potential of the technological breakthrough and that is able to 
attract a cluster of pioneers.
15 The ‘big bang’ is preceded by a gestation 
period that can be very long and operates during the maturity phase of 
the previous long wave. Thus, at the end of each wave, two distinct 
processes coexist: on the one hand, the incumbent techno-economic 
paradigm has to cope with market saturation for its products and with 
the very limited scope for further innovations; on the other hand, 
some dynamic entrepreneurs draw on the available stock of inventions 
and scientific discoveries to transform them into radical process and 
product innovations. Such a coexistence of the old phase with the 
incipient one creates a socio-political split as, when the new techno-
logical revolution irrupts, the logic and the effects of its predecessor 
are still dominant and exert powerful resistance. It follows a period of 
great uncertainty and turbulence, calling for structural and institu-
tional adjustment.  
It should be emphasised that there is no mechanical sequence to 
be found in the re-regulation of society that characterises the long-
wave mechanism. In fact,  
“nothing guarantees that decision makers will take this route. This 
is, in fact, a time of indetermination, when the particular mode of 
growth that will shape the world of the next two or three decades is 
defined. Its characteristics will be within the range made viable by 
the potential of the paradigm, but the choice within that wide 
range will depend on the interests, lucidity, relative power and ef-
fectiveness of the social forces participating in the process” (Pérez 
2002, p. 53).  
This uncertainty of the final issue does not undermine the possi-
bility of a theory. In fact,  
“what is significant, in terms of the value of the model, is that there 
are causal chains and identifying features that can help the analysis 
and the interpretation not only of the regularities but also of some 
of the deviations from the basic pattern” (ibid., p. 123). 
–––––––––– 
15 The ‘big bang’ for the present long wave was the announcement, in 1971, of 
the Intel microprocessor in California. In the fourth long wave it was the production 
of the first model-T car in the Ford plant in Detroit, etc. An economic policy for the fifth long wave  409 
2. An economic policy for the fifth long wave. A European view 
2.1. An appropriate theoretical reference 
Within a long-wave perspective, the main concerns of both macroeco-
nomic and sectoral policies should be the diffusion of the new techno-
economic paradigm resulting from ICT. In what follows, some indica-
tions in this sense will be given considering, first, two macroeconomic 
policies from a European point of view – i.e. the conditions for stimu-
lating innovation and growth and the necessity to re-establish the 
primacy of productive capital (the ‘de-financialization’ of the econ-
omy). The two following points will concern the question of the 
institutional changes in the system of social relations that are required 
for the full deployment of the new techno-economic paradigm; we 
shall consider the possible features of a wage nexus appropriate to the 
new long wave and the labour market policy. Finally, we shall address 
the controversial question of the regime of intellectual property rights. 
The policies we suggest should be applied at both European and na-
tional level, according to the principle of subsidiarity. 
We shall not deal explicitly with the some crucial topics of eco-
nomic policy on which, fortunately, there is public awareness and, 
consequently, their significance need not be debated in the present 
work. They cover: a) the problem of adapting the skills of the labour 
force to the requirements of the new technological style by public and 
private investments in vocational training, general education and 
research − a decisive pre-condition for the diffusion of the technologi-
cal revolution; b) the necessity to increase the amount of basic and 
applied research in the European Union;
16 c) the policy to promote 
innovation – radical, incremental and organisational.
17 
Two limitations of the analysis presented below must be empha-
sised. First the arguments to be treated are chosen on the exclusive 
basis of what is deemed crucial to favour the full implementation of 
the new long wave in Europe. Thus, they are far from exhausting the 
–––––––––– 
16 For instance, one of the objectives at the European level is to increase the total 
spending on R&D to 3% of GDP by 2010 in order to fill the present gap with respect 
to the US and Japan. 
17 See the European Commission (1995). For a thorough analysis see Borrás 
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list of the most important topics to be dealt with by economic policy 
in the years to come. Other subjects of equal importance for the 
general economic policy are left aside and cover, for instance, new 
forms of taxation, ecological sustainability, the elimination of the gap 
between the North and the South of the world, a fair international 
order and, last but not least, the problem of employment.
18  
The second limitation of the proposals below is that they should 
be considered more as indications of the direction to follow than 
detailed recipes. The institutional and policy adjustments required for 
the successful implementation of a new long wave are indeed a societal 
stake and, as such, they are the object of intense social and political 
struggles between the forces that oppose change (because they benefit 
from the status quo) and the forces that want to promote it. In addi-
tion, this type of conflict is modulated by the more general struggle 
for social justice. Thus, it is obvious that one cannot predict the pre-
cise features of the final outcome. 
This does not mean, of course, that economic policy has no role 
to play in this conflictual context. It can, first of all, establish the 
general economic environment favourable to innovation. Second, it 
could favour the solution of social conflicts by providing an appropri-
ate regulatory framework assuring that the aspirations and legitimate 
interests of the weakest components of society are protected. Third, 
there is a large scope for adapting the existing technical and financial 
regulations to the needs of the new paradigm. Before dealing with this 
point, we would like to comment on the policy followed during the 
last 25 years or so. 
Unlike in the US,
19 in most European countries, economic 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s was more and more inspired by the 
neoclassical theory, including the Vulgate of the aggregate production 
function and the Solow growth model.
20 In our view, this is the fun-
–––––––––– 
18 The analysis conducted elsewhere by one of us (Reati 1998, Michie and Reati 
1998, ch. 5) led to the conclusion that, due to the pervasive character of the present 
technological revolution in ICT, in the medium to long term the employment trend is 
likely to be one of stagnation or even decline. It is thus necessary to devise an eco-
nomic policy to counter this unfavourable trend; in our view such a policy should 
focus mainly on shorter working time. 
19 See below. 
20 Things substantially improved with the endogenous growth theory, drawing 
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damental reason why, after more than two decades, the results in 
terms of employment and growth are so poor. Space limitations do 
not allow recalling our main criticisms to neoclassical theory – some-
thing that has already been done by others.
21 We just stick on facts, 
considering the present of unemployment. From the neoclassical point 
of view, allowing the free play of market forces could solve such a 
problem, and the task of economic policy is to remove all obstacles to 
such a free play of the market, i.e. the ‘imperfections’ and rigidities as 
well as government interventions. During the 1960s and 1970s, in the 
European Union there were very rigid labour markets and, at the 
same time, near full employment (a rate of unemployment around 
2%). Now the situation is reversed: European labour markets are 
rather flexible (even very flexible in some instances, e.g. UK and Italy), 
but the rate of unemployment is, apart from some exceptions, four 
times higher. It is thus evident that the cause of the present unem-
ployment is not to be found in the ‘rigidities’ of labour markets and, if 
our policy is essentially oriented towards the elimination of such 
rigidities, we miss the target, with the result that the problem aggra-
vates. In other words, neoclassical theory diverts attention from the 
essential, that is how to promote the structural change that could 
make full employment possible. The elimination of some rigidity 
could help, but these are only details!
22 
2.2. Suggested directions – selected issues 
2.2.1. The case for a Keynesian policy of demand 
At present, the new technological paradigm based on ICT has already 
concluded the first phase of its diffusion in all European countries and 
in the US, and it is now progressing at different speeds along phase 
–––––––––– 
nately, this theory too suffers from the conceptual shortcomings resulting by the use 
of aggregate production functions with the standard neoclassical properties. 
21 See, for instance, the controversy on the theory of capital of the 1960s (Har-
court 1972, Pasinetti 2000) and, also, the recent institutionalist thought (e.g. Hodgson 
1988). 
22 In a recent empirical study on employment protection legislation and practices 
in 27 OECD countries, OECD (1999) dismisses the conventional wisdom of a signifi-
cant positive association between employment protection legislation strictness and 
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two (Figure 1). For Europe, a full expansion of innovation and market 
potential crucially depends on good prospects for aggregate demand.  
It is worth noting, in this regard, that it is precisely the dy-
namics of demand during the last decade that explains the different 
degree of diffusion of the new paradigm in the US and in the Euro-
pean Union. In fact, to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, Europe was 
constantly submitted to rigid demand restraints, something that 
slowed down innovation. The US took the opposite route, adopting a 
very expansionary economic policy with lower and lower interest 
rates, strong increases in military expenses, generous support to re-
search, very easy credit to consumption. Thus, notwithstanding the 
official declarations, US economic policy generally did not follow the 
neoclassical recipe of budgetary orthodoxy, but it was a mixture of 
Keynesian demand support plus a (not necessarily Keynesian) deficit 
spending. This resulted in two big deficits: –4.8% of GDP for the 
public budget in 2003 and –5.6% of GDP for the current external 
transactions.
23 
It follows that, at the European level, the problem is to have a 
macroeconomic policy supportive of innovations, in order to facilitate 
the full deployment of the new technological paradigm. Here one 
should distinguish radical innovations – those that establish a new 
technological paradigm – from incremental innovations, that operate 
within an existing technological style. The former are those able to 
provoke a new upswing because they produce a leap in the level of 
labour productivity of the innovator and sustained growth in the 
productivity of the economy; the latter can only keep the system on 
low-growth path, as they prolong the effects of the previous techno-
logical revolution. The long-wave literature has shown that the major 
innovations materialise during the depression phase of the long wave 
(the “maturity” in Pérez’s more neutral terminology); they tend to 
appear in the existing industries and concern processes as well as 
products (Van Duijn 1983). Mensch (1979) explains this somewhat 
paradoxical fact noting that, when depression reaches its deepest point 
–––––––––– 
23 For the decade 1983-92 the deficit of general government amounted to an aver-
age of –4.7% of GDP. The only exception to easy public finance was during the years 
1996-2001, when deficit was modest or there was even a surplus (1998 to 2000). See 
European Commission (2003a, p. 40). It is well known that the US can afford these 
imbalances thanks to their privilege to control the money for international transac-
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and enterprises have a very poor (or even negative) profitability, 
capitalists are faced with a choice: either they innovate, bringing the 
rate of profit to a normal level, or they disappear. Innovations over-
come depression. In Pérez’s model this forms the phase one of the 
installation period. 
At this point, for the process of radical innovations to con-
tinue, it is necessary that capitalists – or innovatively inclined manag-
ers of socially owned firms – foresee good prospects for demand. Were 
this not the case, old firms that survived from the depression and 
newcomers would hardly invest in new processes or engage in the 
market for new products. This is the ‘demand-pull’ hypothesis, argu-
ing that innovation activity of firms is positively correlated with the 
growth of demand (Schmookler 1966). Such a hypothesis holds for 
both radical and incremental innovations and has found empirical 
support (see Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999 and the references they 
quote).  
To boost aggregate demand we should act on investment as 
well as on private consumption. 
Consider first public investment. Accepting the already existing 
proposal to exclude this type of investment from the 3% deficit crite-
rion could appreciably ease the current constraints on public finance 
stemming from the Maastricht Treaty. In 1993 public investment in 
EU-15 amounted to 2.4% of GDP (3.3% in the USA and 4.4% in Japan) 
while, before the long stagnation, it represented on average 4% of 
GDP.
24 Comparing the present situation with the relative level attained 
at the end of the long expansion, we thus see that the suggested modifi-
cation of the Maastricht criteria would give ample room for boosting 
growth without perturbing the normal functioning of the system. 
It is, in fact, a golden rule of Keynesian economics that, while 
public consumption expenditure must be covered by fiscal receipts (a 
balanced current budget), public expenditure for physical capital can 
also be financed by debt. This does not introduce an unbalancing 
factor into the system because the liabilities of the public budget (the 
debt issued to buy the productive capital) find their exact counterpart 
in the productive assets registered on the other side of the budget. 
–––––––––– 
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These physical capitals may even produce a flow of income, making it 
possible to pay interest and gradually refund the debt (Pasinetti 1995). 
In any case, as was demonstrated by Pasinetti (1998), the sus-
tainability of public finance is realised when there is a decreasing (or at 
most a non-increasing) ratio of public debt to GDP in nominal terms. 
Thus, the fact of fixing the targets to 60% for the public debt/GDP 
ratio and to 3% for the deficit/GDP ratio represents an unnecessary 
restriction, with no theoretical justifications. 
Private consumption can be raised by re-establishing the link 
between productivity growth and wage increases. This link was one of 
the institutional settings favouring expansion in the fourth long wave 
in most European countries (the ‘Fordist’ period) and was broken 
during the last two decades. In fact, as we can see from figure 2, the 
rate of profit in the European Union follows a growing trend since 
1980, in such a way that the present level of profitability is higher than 
the peak it reached during the long expansion of the fourth long wave 
(year 1969). For the US, the situation is similar. 
FIGURE 2 
THE RATE OF PROFIT − TOTAL ECONOMY 
 
Rate of profit = net operating surplus/net capital stock at current replacement prices 
Sources: European Commission, European Economy, no. 63, 1997, p. 28; European Commission, 
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Two polar possibilities to sustain private consumption are o-
pen, both being compatible with price stability and the invariance of 
the profit share: i) wage increases of the different industries (or firms) 
are set by the productivity growth of the respective industry in which 
they are paid; or ii) wage growth is indexed with the average produc-
tivity increase of the economic system. Of course, this alternative way 
to connect wages with productivity can assure a stable price level only 
if the enterprises experiencing productivity increases higher than the 
average decrease their prices accordingly, and the opposite for enter-
prises with productivity growth less than the average. This second 
possibility is preferable from the point of view of equity because it 
allows all people to share the benefits of technical change. 
Considering that the suggested link of wages with productiv-
ity will keep the unit labour cost unchanged, such a policy, if gener-
ally adopted in Europe, will not produce, by itself, a delocalisation of 
productive activities towards low-wage countries. 
2.2.2. Re-establishing the primacy of productive capital  
As we noted in section 1.5, a typical feature of long waves is the ap-
pearance of excessive financial speculation and financial bubbles dur-
ing the second phase of the installation period of the new technologi-
cal paradigm (the “frenzy” phase, in Pérez’s words). Such a phenome-
non does not happen by chance, but is one of the most conspicuous 
manifestations of the febrile activity and the process of trials and 
errors that result from radical structural change. Thus, no wonder that 
in the recent years there was in the US a financial bubble that pushed 
the NASDAQ to incredibly high levels and that was followed by a 
financial débâcle. In economic history all this is a déjà vu, as the desta-
bilising effect that this exerts on the economic system is also déjà vu.  
In fact, securing long-term economic expansion underpinned 
by technological innovation requires appropriate financing mecha-
nisms. Such mechanisms are necessary to ensure that companies can 
adequately finance their investments and technological improvements, 
but also to ensure that such financing is directed towards improving 
the capital stock. However, the physiological relation between pro-
ductive and financial capital is upset when financial capital is not any 
more the facilitator of accumulation in physical assets but becomes the BNL Quarterly Review  416 
dominant driver of the economy and dictates capital accumulation in 
the entire system (Toporowski 2003).  
In advanced capitalist economies, the mechanisms in question 
can be broadly divided into those that are speculative and those that 
are accommodating.
25  
Speculative mechanisms are driven by expectations of refi-
nancing possibilities in the financial markets. An investment financed 
by a loan or an issue of securities may be refinanced in the financial 
markets by the holder of that loan or securities selling them. Obvi-
ously, the profit on the sale of the loan or securities is an additional 
incentive to engage in such financing. It has the advantage that it is not 
paid out of the proceeds of the investment, which the loan or securi-
ties originally financed, but by someone who is willing to buy the 
loan or securities at a higher price than the original value of the financ-
ing. That higher price depends on the liquidity in the financial mar-
kets. If there is excessive liquidity, then securities prices will be rising, 
and there will be a good market for speculative finance. If there is 
insufficient liquidity in the markets, then it will be difficult or impos-
sible to refinance at a profit. 
However, speculative financing mechanisms are ephemeral. If 
financial markets become less liquid, then the inability to refinance at 
a profit causes speculative finance to dry up. Existing financings come 
to rely for their profit on the revenue from the investment financed. 
This revenue depends on the kind of business in which the investment 
is being implemented. Usually retail services (shops, trading activities) 
have good cash flow, even when they are less profitable. Typically, 
new technology has very uncertain cash flow, which is why invest-
ments in it are all the more dependent on refinancing possibilities in 
the financial markets. Any decline in the liquidity of the financial 
markets, or in the return from new technology therefore tends to 
cause speculative finance to shift away from new technology and into 
established trading activities, which have good or at least predictable 
cash flow, but offer relatively few opportunities for industrial innova-
tion. Thus speculative finance is an inconstant source of financial 
support for new technology. 
–––––––––– 
25 This corresponds approximately to the distinction made by Keynes in chapter 
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In contrast with speculation, accommodating financing me- 
chanisms are driven by the profit expectations of entrepreneurs. As a 
check on the realism of these expectations, innovations are best under-
taken in existing corporations using their own financial resources. 
This ensures that decisions to finance particular innovations are made 
by individuals with knowledge of the industrial potential of innova-
tions, and the market for their eventual output. Adam Smith had 
argued this over two hundred years ago. 
A precondition for accommodating finance is the elimination 
of financial inflation raising the market value of financial claims. 
Financial inflation is, as argued above, the condition for speculative 
finance of innovation. Such inflation affects in particular markets for 
longer-term financial assets, whose market value is less constrained by 
imminent redemption. But it also has three other undesirable effects 
on the capital formation of business corporations. First of all, the 
speculative gains that may be obtained with financial inflation are the 
opportunity cost of other investments, in particular in fixed capital 
formation. Therefore the greater is financial inflation, the less attrac-
tive is industrial innovation to business corporations. Firms can make 
more money more quickly through merger and acquisition or man-
agement buy-out activity than from long-term commitment to pro-
ductive activity. Secondly, speculative positions taken in financial 
markets by non-financial corporations, most notably through merger 
and takeover activity, but also through other kinds of purchase and 
sale of assets for profit, require liquid assets to held in addition to the 
funds committed to actual investments in financial assets. This is 
because the ever-changing conjuncture in financial markets increases 
the risk that assets may not be able to be realised at a profit as planned. 
This additional liquidity reduces further the amount of its own re-
sources which a company can commit to new technology and fixed 
capital formation.  
Thirdly, the inflation of the market for long-term securities 
leads to the over-capitalisation of non-financial corporations. Like 
over-indebtedness, over-capitalisation, or holding capital in excess of 
the value of productive capital, increases the liquidity preference of 
companies, and discourages investment in relatively illiquid fixed 
capital and new technology (Toporowski 2000, part I). The result is 
that large corporations, which account for the vast bulk of private 
sector fixed capital investment, com e  t o  h a v e  a  d i f f e r e n t  m o d e  o f  BNL Quarterly Review  418 
operation to that of previous large companies. The modern, over-
capitalised or ‘financialised’ corporation makes money through profit-
able balance sheet restructuring, for example, mergers and takeovers 
on the asset side, or profitable refinancing on the liabilities side. 
Eliminating financial inflation, without causing a deflation of 
the kind that Japan has experienced since 1990, is not easy. The con-
ventional wisdom is that it can be done by interest rate changes 
and/or by ‘moral suasion’, for example Alan Greenspan’s famous pro- 
nouncement in 1996 concerning ‘irrational exuberance’ in the mar-
kets. The difficulty with interest rate changes is that, to have an effect 
on the markets, changes in interest rates usually have to be quite large. 
This precludes fine-tuning of the markets. Moreover, interest rates are 
nowadays used to target inflation or economic activity. Adding a third 
target, of financial inflation (however measured), may lead to increased 
confusion and uncertainty in the markets if, for example, inflation and 
economic activity are stable or falling, but the stock market is rising 
strongly (see Goodhart 2001). 
An alternative way is to use open market operations in an in-
novative way for the purpose of regulating liquidity in the financial 
markets rather than, as at present, to enforce a target short-term rate 
of interest in the money markets. In this way, if stock markets were 
rising so strongly as to encourage speculation in them, central banks 
would sell bonds to take excess liquidity out of the markets and slow 
down the growth of share prices. If, on the contrary, the government 
or companies had new bond issues they want to make and no adequate 
liquidity is available in the market, the central bank would buy in 
stocks to ensure adequate liquidity was available in the market to take 
up those stocks. Such open market operations would therefore facili-
tate a more active fiscal policy on the part of governments, as well as 
more accommodating finance for corporations. Indeed, open market 
operations of this kind were undertaken in the United States by the 
Federal Reserve after the Second World War, up to 1951. In recent 
years they have been used to stabilise markets, but not systematically. 
Intervention of this kind in the capital markets could not eliminate 
economic instability (Toporowski 2003). But it would eliminate that 
part of it which emanates from alternating episodes of excess and 
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The main institutional difficulty preventing such open market 
operations is the lack of capital of central banks in relation to the 
amount of turnover in securities markets. On global scale this could 
only be remedied by capitalising central banks on an appropriate scale.  
Within Europe, such practical and political difficulties have 
largely been removed by the institutions of the European Monetary 
Union and the European System of Central Banks, but at present the 
scope of open market operations by central banks in Europe is very 
limited. Much of these operations consist of repurchase agreements, 
whose purpose is in effect to keep money market interest rates close to 
the European Central Bank’s target rate for short-term interest rates. 
In continental Europe central banks use 14-day paper (whose maturity 
is now being reduced to seven days) to regulate the liquidity of banks, 
rather than to maintain or reduce liquidity in markets for long-term 
securities. In the UK, a much wider range of securities is used in open 
market operations, perhaps to less effect because sterling money mar-
ket interest rates in London seem to fluctuate more widely around the 
B a n k  o f  E n g l a n d ’ s  ‘ R e p o ’  r a t e  t h a n  d o  e u r o  m o n e y  m a r k e t  r a t e s  
around the ECB’s rate.  
To expand their open market operations central banks in the 
European Union could be capitalised by an issue of long-term securi-
ties by the European Central Bank (ECB) that would be bought by 
national central banks, with money borrowed from the ECB at the 
same rate of interest as is paid on the ECB bonds. In this way the 
balance sheets of all these institutions could be expanded, but would 
balance: a national central bank would have its liabilities increased by 
its borrowing from the ECB, but would have assets corresponding to 
this borrowing, in the form of the ECB bonds. The ECB would then 
undertake to buy back these bonds for cash at their issue price at any 
time from a national central bank. This would give central banks the 
capital and liquidity to intervene effectively in financial markets.  
National central banks would then be in a position to calm 
excessive stock market speculation by selling their ECB bonds into the 
market. They should be able to sell them at their issue price, because 
buyers would have the assurance that these securities would always be 
liquid at that price (the national central bank could always buy them 
back and sell them back to the ECB at that issue price). Indeed, if the 
prices of company securities rise, then by definition the market yield 
of ECB and government bonds would increase relative to the prices of BNL Quarterly Review  420 
company securities. This relative advantage may itself be insufficient 
to persuade investors to moderate their buying of company securi-
ties.
26 In this case, open market operations may be reinforced by 
compulsory reserve holdings of government and ECB bonds by fidu-
ciary institutions, such as pension funds, insurance companies and 
investment funds. If the national central banks were given the right to 
vary such reserve requirements, then merely signalling that the central 
bank will raise these reserve requirements, forcing fund managers to 
sell company stocks to buy more ECB and government bonds, may be 
sufficient to keep markets from rising excessively. If markets fell, and 
became illiquid, then the ECB could always sell the bonds back to the 
ECB for cash, and then enter the market with that cash to buy ECB 
bonds and government securities to provide liquidity. This system 
would ensure that the market had adequate liquidity for the purposes 
of financing government bond issues and company securities, but not 
so much liquidity that the market became speculative. By restricting 
their purchases and sales to central bank and official (government) 
paper, central banks could influence the overall liquidity of the mar-
ket, without having to take a view on the price of corporate securities. 
This scheme would allow European central banks to pursue systemati-
cally what is already done in a partial and unsystematic way by central 
banks (e.g., in Japan, Hong Kong and the UK).  
Our proposal would not need any change in the statutes of the 
European Central Bank, since it would concern the issue and holding 
of central bank securities, and their subsequent purchase and sale, 
rather than, necessarily, government securities. Furthermore, national 
central banks, rather than the ECB, would conduct the open market 
operations, since European capital markets are still, and will be for 
some time yet, nationally organised. Thus, this scheme would under-
pin the existing arrangements, whereby national central banks have 
responsibility for financial stability in their respective countries, but 
with very limited instruments for securing such stability. By giving 
assured liquidity to central bank and government securities, central 
banks would encourage the holding of such securities in financial 
–––––––––– 
26 In his Treatise on Money Keynes had argued that the central bank could manage 
the liquidity of capital markets easily by means of open market operations. One of the 
less noted innovations in his General Theory was Keynes’s recognition that such 
management may be more difficult in practice. See Keynes (1930, pp. 371-73; 1936, pp. 
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portfolios. By stabilising portfolios in this way, central banks would 
discourage forced sales of corporate securities that occasionally deprive 
markets for long-term securities of the liquidity that they need to 
function properly. Furthermore, by trading a benchmark stock in all 
the national markets, such an arrangement would help to bring about 
an integrated European capital market. 
If the scheme was open to national central banks in Europe 
outside the monetary union (the European Union member countries 
outside the euro-zone), such arrangements could be extended to sup-
port exchange rate stability in Europe. Euros obtained from the resale 
of ECB bonds back to the ECB could be used to support exchange 
rates within Europe. In this way a ‘zone of financial stability’ would 
be created within Europe that would support effective fiscal policy 
and accommodating finance, whose stability and predictability would 
focus enterprise on productive activities rather than speculation. The 
success of such a zone of financial stability in Europe would encourage 
its emulation elsewhere in the world, and thereby encourage the 
stabilisation of the global financial system.
27  
Let us now pass to the other topics of economic policy that 
we address in this paper by considering the system of social relations. 
2.2.3. The employment relationship 
Among the institutional changes that are most required for the full 
deployment of the fifth long wave in Europe there is the reform of the 
employment relationship. Indeed, we shall see below that the present 
prevailing set of relations is inimical to labour. Besides the obvious 
social injustice, this constitutes a positive obstacle to innovation. Of 
course, the new institutional setting is, more than any other, depend-
ent from the social struggles between workers and employees whose 
final outcome cannot be predicted. What we can do is just to outline 
the direction in which the reform should go. At this purpose, let us 
start by considering the ‘Fordist consensus’ that preceded the current 
situation and its flaking off. 
–––––––––– 
27 For an alternative set of proposals, putting emphasis on taxation and interna-
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The social consensus that made the long upswing of the fourth 
long wave in Europe possible (1950-1973) rested on two elements of 
the regime of regulation: mass consumption and a comprehensive 
welfare state.
28 The first element of regulation was established by a 
systematic link between real wages and productivity increases, that 
provided the demand for mass production. The establishment of a 
‘social norm of consumption’ fuelled demand: products that were the 
prerogative of the rich class became more widely affordable and en-
tered into the consumption basket of the working class (e.g. cars, 
holidays). Unions played a crucial role with a bargaining procedure at 
sectoral level that allowed a parallel and foreseeable growth of real 
wage and productivity. This created favourable business expectations 
that sustained investment. In parallel, the regular growth of workers’ 
purchasing power was complemented by a pervasive welfare state (the 
‘indirect wage’) giving protection against the main risks and the uncer-
tainty of unemployment. 
The Fordist technical basis was an automated and dedicated 
plant and equipment producing standardised commodities with a 
rather stable product mix. The organisational structure was hierarchi-
cal and departmental. Design and implementation stages of production 
were separated and performed by two different categories of employees. 
The typical worker of the Fordist period was male and low 
skilled. He benefited from a full-time permanent contract to provide a 
labour activity as defined by his job profile. The various forms of 
protection were linked to the professional status, defined in terms of a 
person’s occupation and distinctively associated with the continuity of 
employment throughout the lifetime. 
The ICT technological revolution required profound organ-
isational changes that were not compatible with the rigid Fordist 
organisation and the corresponding employment relationship. How-
ever, when assessing the changes in the employment relationship of 
the last two decades, one should consider that they are not just a 
question of technology, but are also a consequence of the already 
mentioned unbalanced power relationship between capital and labour.  
The ICT style modified the previous technical basis: flexible 
production systems tended to replace the Fordist dedicated plant and 
–––––––––– 
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equipment, and this allowed a customisation of output. Also, the 
general availability of PCs, the introduction of local area networks 
and the rapid changes in product and process design eroded the old 
hierarchical structure, making some layers of management unneces-
sary. At the same time, ICT technology drastically changed the skill 
requirements of the labour force – instead of the unskilled worker of 
the Fordist organisation, the new technology demanded medium- to 
high-skilled workers.
29 Finally to increase profits, enterprises trans-
ferred the hazard of demand on their workers by engaging on a tem-
porary basis, and outside, by outsourcing a range of activities. We now 
have a multiplicity of work relations (part-time, temporary, ‘on-call’, 
traineeship, false self-employment) that create precariousness, uncer-
tainty about the future and loss of individual and collective rights. 
This last aspect is particularly relevant with the disintegration of the 
Fordist professional status, that is not any more unique and whose 
continuity is undermined by internal and external flexibility, the first 
referring to the fact that a worker is frequently employed in different 
jobs with the same employer, the second to casual employment. Also, 
the concept of single employer sometimes vanishes both in regard to 
the entity concerned (groups or networks of companies) and over 
time. 
The opposing parties have a common interest in reaching an 
institutional architecture appropriate for the new techno-economic 
paradigm, as any delay or inadequacies will defer the benefits of the 
ongoing long wave. However, things are not simple, as in both fields 
there are forces that obstruct progress. 
On the workers side, those who still enjoy a relatively secure 
position tend to be reluctant to change, and this creates an obstacle to 
the labour flexibility required by structural change (see section 2.2.4 
below). On the capitalists’ side, one can detect two tendencies – that 
we would call ‘short termism’ and ‘forward looking’. The first strat-
egy consists of maximising short-term profits, taking maximum advan-
tage of the power obtained by the defeat of workers that resulted from 
the depression of the 1970s. In fact, the very high unemployment 
weakened Unions by reducing the number of their members and 
undermining the cohesion of those still at work. This made it possible 
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to have real wage growth less than productivity even in the 1990s, 
when the rate of profit had attained satisfactory levels (figure 2), to 
implement various forms of labour market flexibility that discourage 
technical innovation (the ‘labour-controlling flexibility’, see section 
2.2.4 below) and give rise to growing inequalities. The ‘short-termist’ 
fraction of employers reflects mainly, but not exclusively, the interests 
of financial capital, and is very much in tune with the “frenzy” phase 
of the wave that characterised the 1990s in several countries. 
The other fraction of employers (the ‘forward looking’) repre-
sents the interests of productive capital and believes that, for the long-
term viability of the system, it is better to renounce some advantages 
resulting from the present favourable power situation by giving room 
to workers’ claims for fairness and social justice. In other words, it is 
preferable to win in the long run than winning all along the line in the 
short run and risking harming the stability of social order. Keynes and 
his epigones were the main representatives of this fraction of the 
bourgeoisie – a fraction that at present covers only a minority. How-
ever, it is only by this kind of approach that a new employment 
relationship favourable to the further diffusion of ICT techno- 
economic paradigm can be built. Consequently, economic policy 
should be oriented in this sense.  
A reconstruction of the employment relationship appropriate to 
the ICT technological style that, at the same time, grants to workers 
the protections typical of a modern society, could be conceived on 
the lines of a recent report sponsored by the European Commission – 
the Supiot (1999) report. In this report, the proposals for a reform of 
the employment relationship are presented under six headings, four of 
which being most directly linked with the purpose of this paper: i) 
work and private power; ii) work and employment status; iii) work 
and collective organisation; iv) work and the State.
30 
The first set of proposals aim at protecting workers from the 
insecurity resulting from the casualisation of labour, mass unemploy-
ment and new management practices that make subordination weigh 
more heavily (see Supiot 1999, pp. 296 ff.).  
Concerning the loss of protection that results from the reduc-
tion of Fordist professional status the report suggests to redefine the 
–––––––––– 
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employment status in order to guarantee the continuity of a career 
rather than the stability of specific conditions resulting from a given 
wage relationship, and to enlarge the definition of professional status, 
which should no longer be determined on the basis of the restrictive 
criterion of employment but on a broader notion of works, that 
include non-marketable forms of work.  
To reconstruct the system of collective bargaining, the report 
recommends, among other things, an active support from public 
authorities for recasting collective bargaining and, also, centring the 
negotiations on networked companies and territorial networks 
whereby businesses and other interest groups join forces (at local or 
regional level, for instance). 
To correct for the current decline of the welfare state, the re-
port advocates a new kind of intervention to be linked to an overall 
concept of social rights based on solidarity. This solidarity should not 
be thought of as solidarity facing an individual need, but as solidarity 
guaranteeing individual and collective security in the face of uncer-
tainty. Rather than the concept of social protection, social citizenship 
might synthesise the objectives of recasting labour law and social law 
in general. 
Let us now see how the controversial question of labour mar-
ket flexibility fits within the new system of social relations. 
2.2.4. A targeted flexibility of labour 
As already noted, the diffusion of ICT technological style and the 
ensuing changes in patterns of demand modify substantially the or-
ganisation of enterprises as well as the structure of the economy. At 
the enterprise level, workers should acquire new skills and accept 
more flexible structures implying, among other things, different work-
ing time. At the level of the economy, radical product innovations 
create new industries, the sectors adopting radical process innovations 
increase their share of total output, while the traditional sectors de-
cline. This diversified impact of technical change entails a permanent 
shift in the structure of employment, which calls for a continuous 
flow of workers from contracting to expanding sectors. The required 
mobility of labour is not easily obtained, and this provides consider-
able scope for government action. Besides disseminating appropriate BNL Quarterly Review  426 
information on labour market opportunities, the most important task 
for public authorities is to provide constant retraining and skill devel-
opment for the population. Second, to facilitate the geographical 
mobility for workers, government should provide the basic infrastruc-
tures for families (infant schools, etc.) in the expanding regions and 
stimulate the supply of lodgings. This kind of labour flexibility that is 
required by structural change should be actively pursued, as it is 
growth-enhancing and directly targeted to job creation; it is also a 
prerequisite for obtaining all the benefits in terms of costs and com-
petitivity which can result from the ongoing technological revolution 
in ICT. 
H o w e v e r ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  w h a t  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  a s s u m e d ,  o t h e r  
forms of labour flexibility represent a positive obstacle to a successful 
diffusion of the new technological style, and should then be opposed. 
We are referring here to the forms of flexibility whose principal aim is 
to submit labour to capital (labour-controlling flexibility), and consist 
in making jobs more precarious, in imposing part-time working, in 
reducing social protection by transforming normal employees into 
self-employed workers, in increasing inequality by cutting wages at the 
bottom of the scale, in facilitating dismissals.  
Consider, for instance, the conditions for a successful imple-
mentation of ICT at the enterprise level. It is generally admitted that, 
to attain such an objective, a close involvement of the labour force is 
necessary, involving trust and participation. Such conditions are 
hampered by short-term labour contracts with no guarantee of stabil-
ity and by downward wage flexibility. Concerning this latter aspect, 
one should refer to the theory of efficiency wages, which shows that 
workers’ effort and commitment (hence productivity) is positively 
correlated to the level of wage; wage reductions can thus reduce work-
ers’ involvement and hamper the successful adoption of new tech-
nologies (Kleinknecht 1998, Michie and Sheehan 2003). Furthermore, 
the wage flexibility in question increases the propensity to save of 
workers and the middle classes as a reaction to uncertainty. This 
would tend to reduce the effectiveness of aggregate demand policy, 
and the solvency of long-term contractual financial institutions such as 
pension funds. 
Innovation is also discouraged by easy dismissals because, wi-
thin this institutional framework, enterprises tend to postpone the 
adoption of labour saving techniques. Thus, productivity is not maxi-An economic policy for the fifth long wave  427 
mised and, in the long run, this harms the international competitivity 
of the firms. Finally, in a highly flexible labour market, enterprises 
have less incentive to train their personnel, since part of the benefits 
from such investments may accrue to their competitors. 
We conclude now our survey of the most suitable policy 
choices for the incoming fifth long waves by assessing the discussion 
over the intellectual property rights – a regulation that seems crucial 
for the further diffusion of the technological revolution (for a more 
complete treatment see Borrás 2003).  
2.2.5. A new regime for intellectual property rights 
In the current literature, the ongoing fifth long wave is called the 
‘knowledge based society’. This inaccurate terminology – all societies 
of the past were based on knowledge! – nevertheless draws attention 
to another essential condition for the diffusion of new paradigm, i.e. 
the necessity of appropriate institutions for spreading information and 
knowledge in all fields of activities.  
The transfer of knowledge that is at the root of innovation 
can take several forms, following the distinction between codified and 
tacit knowledge. The first type of knowledge covers both public 
knowledge – i.e. what is fully disclosed in publications – and the 
private knowledge protected by patents, and only partially disclosed. 
Tacit (or uncodified) knowledge is a typical feature of organisations 
and it is the main component of the learning process that leads to 
innovation. However, although tacit knowledge is usually very impor-
tant, in general it is not the exclusive element for innovation activity, 
and it is within this context that the question of intellectual property 
rights can arise. 
It is generally accepted that, to stimulate investments in R&D, 
it is necessary to grant the inventor a reward in the form of a tempo-
rary monopoly over the invention (the patent). It is also usually ad-
mitted that patents can cover only inventions and not the result of 
basic research leading to discoveries, as this general knowledge belongs 
to the common good of mankind. 
Patents give rise to two conflicting interests. On the one hand, 
there is the necessity (or the opportunity) to reward invention by 
allowing for a monopoly. On the other hand, public interest requires BNL Quarterly Review  428 
the easy availability of the results of past research in order to make 
further advances in knowledge and innovation. Public interest is also 
jeopardised by the well-known monopolistic practice consisting in 
patenting inventions without exploiting them, the purpose being to 
exclude competition. 
The conflict between private and public interest is particularly 
relevant in the present situation, as the intellectual property rights 
regime could either favour the further diffusion of the new techno-
logical paradigm or it could delay it. Easier diffusion could be achieved 
by a system granting a flexible and relatively light protection to the 
already established interests, while strong protection could lead to 
opposite result in terms of diffusion. As in all the other fields, the final 
regulatory setting will result from the outcome of the struggle be-
tween groups representing the conflicting interests – a struggle that, 
among other things, manifests itself into strong pressures on public 
authorities. In what follows we summarise the current debate, to make 
apparent what should be the best response of policy makers in 
Europe. 
Developments in the US since the 1980s fuelled discussions 
and concerns on both ethical principles as well as economic efficiency. 
On ethical grounds, the principles at stake concern the legitimacy of 
− patenting living organisms, micro-organisms, genes and par-
tial gene sequences; 
−  privatising elements of common knowledge, such as ma- 
thematical algorithms or basic biological processes and phenomena; 
− private appropriation of the results of publicly funded re-
search. 
On purely economic grounds, there is the concern that a sys-
tem granting too strong protection to private interests is not sustain-
able in the long run because it hampers innovation. Let us make all 
this more explicit. 
Year 1980 represents a landmark in the broad shift of US pol-
icy towards stronger property rights. On the legislative side, the Bayh-
Dole Act provided blanket permission for performers of federally 
funded research to file for patents in their own name and to grant 
licences. In parallel, a Supreme Court Decision (Diamond v. Chakra-An economic policy for the fifth long wave  429 
barty) enlarged the scope of patentability in the biotechnology indus-
try, to cover objects which were previously excluded from it (Orsi and 
Coriat 2003). Thus the frontier between ‘discoveries’ (which were not 
patentable) and ‘inventions’ was displaced, with the results that it is 
now possible to patent microorganisms, genes and partial gene se-
quences. The other sector in which the new approach allows for the 
private appropriation of general scientific knowledge is computer 
software, in which it is now possible to patent algorithms for the 
simultaneous use of equations.  
These developments open up the way to a true commodifica-
tion of scientific knowledge. Moreover, in numerous cases the patents 
granted in the US cover not only inventions of recognised utility but 
also a wide range of future applications. To all this, one should add the 
fact that US patents are granted for extremely long periods (up to 50 
years). 
The architecture of the system was completed by legislative 
and regulatory measures for financial activities that supported the 
commodification of knowledge. One of the most relevant was the 
modification of the ‘prudent man’ law on pension funds so as to 
authorise them to invest part of their capitals in risky securities and 
stocks, something that was previously prohibited (ibid., p. 3). 
This stronger protection of intellectual property rights gave 
brilliant results in economic terms. US university patenting and licens-
ing grew remarkably after 1980 (Mowery and Ziedonis 2001), the 
biotechnology and computer industries developed more than in Eu- 
rope, innovators found capital to finance their projects. For this rea-
son, large industrial groups urge European authorities to go in the 
same direction as the Americans,
31 the delicate ethical problems that 
such an approach would pose notwithstanding.  
Nevertheless, even on a purely economic basis, one should 
question whether the American way is really a good one in a longer-
term perspective. Indeed, several authoritative voices raised concern 
about the dangers of the American practices, which at the end of the 
day could block innovation instead of furthering it. For instance, 
Nelson (2003) convincingly argues against the privatisation of scien-
tific commons on the grounds that this creates an obstacle to further 
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31 For an analysis of the European situation see Borrás (2003). BNL Quarterly Review  430 
progress in science and technology. In fact, the findings of basic sci-
ence are the inputs for further research and, consequently, should have 
open access. Attempting to shift the focus of American policy he 
offers the following guidelines: 
i) not to grant patents on discoveries that largely are of natural 
phenomena, and limiting the scope of patents to elements that are 
artificial;
32 
ii) give a relatively strict interpretation of the meaning of ‘util-
ity’ or usefulness in granting a patent. If, for instance, the direct use-
fulness is an input or a focus of research, this generic knowledge 
should be kept open; 
iii) narrow the patent scope. In fact, in the US there is a strong 
tendency among patent applicants to claim protection far wider than 
they actually achieved, in order to be able to control a wide range of 
possible substitutes. Public interest requires that these tentatives to 
block potential competition be not allowed; 
iv) introduce in the legislation a ‘research exemption’, viz. use 
in pure research is not a violation of a patent. As a counterpart for this 
exemption, universities or other research organisations should not 
patent anything that comes out of the research in question.
33 
History shows that successful societies are those inspired by a 
long-term vision, that succeed in tempering the demands for short-
term profits with the respect of ethical principles. Thus, European 
society should resist the pressures to imitate the American system of 
strong protection of property rights, for a double reason. First and 
foremost for ethical reasons: it is inadmissible that private interests 
appropriate the results of a publicly funded activity whose intrinsic 
purpose is the well-being of society. The same considerations hold for 
the private appropriation of the basic knowledge that is necessary for 
–––––––––– 
32 In practice, the identification of what is a substantial transformation from the 
natural – to be protected by patent – is not always clear-cut. In these cases, Nelson is 
prone to restrict the coverage of the patent. For instance, in the case of purified 
natural substances, patents could be limited to the process and not allow the purified 
product per se to be patented. 
33 Also Heller and Eisenberg (1998) raise concern about the American approach, 
as the proliferation of intellectual property rights in biomedical research can seriously 
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research. Secondly, for economic reasons, as the above discussion of 
the drawbacks of the American system makes clear that such a system 
is not the most appropriate for the ongoing fifth long wave.  
A reform of the European system of property rights should be 
inspired by the four principles laid down by Nelson, and indicate 
clearly what is protected and what cannot be protected. 
Concerning university research, we think that the best way to 
stimulate invention is to provide adequate public funds and allow the 
widest possible exploitation of the results. The current objective of the 
Union to increase substantially the financing of research goes in the 
right direction. 
Two further steps seem necessary, that we just mention, as 
their adequate treatment would require another paper. The first is the 
establishment of the European patent. The second consists of special 
provisions to combat monopolistic practice, e.g. a regulation stating 
that if a patent is not exploited, or insufficiently exploited, within a 
given timeframe, it falls into the public domain.  
3. Conclusions 
The first part of this paper was devoted to reviewing some recent 
contributions to the long-wave theory in order to recall the essential 
points of a theory that, better than any other, is able to explain the 
long-term development of capitalist economies. By showing the stable 
mechanisms that produce the historical sequence of long upswings and 
downswings, long-waves theory provides the tools for understanding 
the present ‘knowledge-based society’ and offers guidance for eco-
nomic policy. 
Considering that the present technological revolution is part 
of the broad phenomenon of a new long wave (the fifth one in the 
history of capitalism), it follows that the main focus of economic 
policy – both macroeconomic and sectoral – should be to support the 
diffusion of the new technological style and to favour the institutional 
changes required by such an objective. This last point is of paramount 
importance, as the full deployment of a new upswing materialises if 
and only if technological and institutional changes proceed together.  BNL Quarterly Review  432 
In real societies, institutional change cannot be dictated from 
the top. Rather, it is the outcome of social conflicts and struggles. In 
fact, the institutional set appropriate for a new regime of accumulation 
requires very deep changes in the organisation of firms, in social 
relations, in the financial sphere, in regulations as in government 
action in general. Thus, it is no wonder that there is conflict between 
forces favourable to change and forces opposing it.  Although the final 
result is unpredictable, this does not mean that public authorities have 
no particular role to play – the market assuring spontaneously the 
necessary adjustment. It is just the opposite. Recent developments on 
financial speculation, growing inequality and persistent unemploy-
ment demonstrate the need for public action to correct for these 
disequilibria. This raises the question of which theory is most suitable 
to guide economic policy.  
During the last decade or so, in most European countries eco-
nomic policy was oriented by neoclassical theory. The poor results 
that were obtained should prove the inadequacy of such a theory to 
direct economic policy towards full employment, social justice and 
growth. Indeed, putting excessive reliance on market adjustments 
within an a-historical theoretical framework, neoclassical theory 
diverts attention from what is essential, thus impeding reaching the 
above-mentioned goals. The US experience of the last decades con-
firms our contention. At the level of official declarations, one cer-
tainly has the impression that US economic policy is the emanation of 
neoclassical theory, but this is not true. In fact, the US macroeco-
nomic policy was fundamentally a mixture of a Keynesian support of 
private consumption and deficit spending (something that is not neces-
sarily Keynesian!), the whole supported by the special position en-
joyed by the US as the issuers of the currency for international trans-
actions. 
Two main factors seem to delay the deployment of the new 
long wave in Europe. The first is the ‘short termism’ of the majority 
of the bourgeoisie that, after winning the social conflicts of the 1960s 
and 1970s, now wants to win all along the line by imposing conditions 
on workers that are inimical to full employment and growth. The 
second is the stifling effect of the implementation of the Maastricht 
criteria. Now that the euro is a reality, it is time to change the general 
orientation of the European macroeconomic policy, if we really want An economic policy for the fifth long wave  433 
to foster employment, growth and the diffusion of the new techno-
logical paradigm. For this reason the present paper suggests a Keynes-
ian policy to boost private consumption by revitalising the ‘golden 
rule’ of linking the evolution of real wages to the increases in labour 
productivity and, also, to ease the Maastricht criteria by excluding 
public investment from the 3% deficit target. 
Another major problem linked with the present phase of the 
long wave is that we are in an ‘era of finance’, where financial capital 
has become so important that it dictates the direction of business 
opportunities and trends in the economy as a whole in a way that 
diverts from capital accumulation in real assets. To re-establish the 
primacy of productive capital – with financial capital playing its 
physiological role of facilitator of the accumulation of physical assets – 
the paper suggests systematic concerted open market operations to 
regulate liquidity in the financial markets. If successful, these actions 
would eliminate the excess liquidity in the markets that are at the 
origin of financial speculations and bubbles. At the same time, such 
operations would secure stable finance for those fiscal operations that 
would be necessary to support public investment. 
The paper addresses the question of social relations from a 
double perspective: i) a new configuration of the employment rela-
tionship that, while taking into consideration the requirements of the 
new technological paradigm, preserves the essential features of the 
‘European social model’; ii) the kind of labour market flexibility that 
favours the diffusion of the ICT technological revolution. 
On the first point we suggest to rely on the proposals of a re-
cent report sponsored by the European Commission (Supiot 1999). 
On the second point, we make a distinction between a ‘labour-
controlling flexibility’ and a ‘growth-enhancing flexibility’. The first 
type of flexibility – that is the kind of all-out market flexibility prea-
ched by neoclassical theory – is a spanner in the works of the diffusion 
of the new technological style. The second kind of flexibility is instead 
an essential prerequisite for such diffusion. 
The paper ends by considering the question of the regime for 
intellectual property rights that is best suited for the new long wave. 
Two points are raised. The first one is a warning not to follow the 
American practice of allowing private appropriation of elements of 
common knowledge, or privatise the results of publicly funded re-BNL Quarterly Review  434 
search as well as to patent living organisms. These practices should be 
opposed first of all for ethical reasons and, also, because in the long 
run they are likely to be counter-productive for promoting innova-
tion. The second point is a plea for a European patent that, among 
other things, indicates clearly what is protected and what cannot be 
protected. 
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